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NOTES AND COMMENT
RIBNIK

v. McBRm.-"Case law resembles a patch-work quilt;

it is strong and serviceable, but to see the pattern you must have
distance, while the makers always look at the last patch when putting
on a new one; * * *" I

When the late Judge Hough spoke these words a decade ago, he
expressed in apt and homely example the general impression of those
intimately familiar with the workings of the judicial process. But to
urge the present accuracy of this broad charge of myopic development of case law would be to deny efficacy to the labors of the sociological jurists in the very hour of major accomplishment. Yet, were
we to restrict ourselves to the subject of Judge Hough's addressthe Supreme Court's concept of due process-we should view a field
sufficiently circumscribed to permit of cogent generalization, in truth,
a field in which the potency of the "last patch" continues unchallenged.
On the eve of its last summer recess, the Supreme Court announced its decision in Ribnik v. McBride. 2 In a paraphrase of its
opinion in Tyson v. Banton, 8 the Court declared unconstitutional that
portion of a New Jersey statutory scheme which, in effect, authorized
the Commissioner of Labor to reject applications for an employment
agent's license upon the ground that proposed fees were excessive. Adherence to the schedule of fees, if and as approved, was
made mandatory
by the statute; there was, however, provision for
4
amendment.
Ribnik's application for a license had been denied, the Commissioner deeming certain of his scheduled fees excessive and unreasonable. The state courts had sustained both the Commissioner's action
and the statutory authority upon which he relied. On review by writ
of error, the Supreme Court found constitutional warrant for the
justice of Ribnik's complaint.
Tyson v. Banton had obviated much of the Court's difficulty.
There it had explained away the German Alliance Insurance case 5 ;
1Hough, Due Process of Lazv--To-day, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 218, 224 (1919).
An address delivered at Cornell University May 3, 1918.
'277 U. S. -, 48 Sup. Ct. 545 (1928).
'273 U. S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426 (1927).
'N. J. Laws 1922, C. 227, p. 822.
6233 U. S.389, 34 Sup. Ct. 612 (1914).
The explanation was achieved by
excerpting from the opinion statements of the reason for organized insurance
and imputations that insurance contracts had greater public effect than other
commercial contracts "whose effect stops with the individuals." Economics,
however, had, years previously, shown that even "individual" losses are thrown
upon the community and that the function of systematic insurance is to order
these losses. Apparently the magnitude of the business supplied the requisite
public interest.
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there it had completed the enshrinement of the notion that certain
businesses are, and always must be, private in nature and beyond the
scope of legislative price regulation. Most significant of all, it had
pledged unwavering allegiance to categorical tests of constitutionality
-either that the affected industry be one included in Lord Hale's
"aphorisms" of two centuries ago; or that circumstances (judicially
determined) justify the Court's indulgence of the legal fiction of
devotion to the public use, and here too, history in the form of some
judicial precedents, controls. 6 New York's attempt to regulate the
charges of ticket brokers had fallen before the "tests" of the Court.
New Jersey's effort to curb employment brokers was destined to a
similar fate, for even the more compelling considerations in favor of
the latter regulation could not be expected to prevail against an
aphorism and a legal fiction.
The majority opinion, in which, incidentally, but five justices
joined, 7 conceded at the outset the State's power "to require a
license and regulate the business of an employment agent." This,
however, was immediately qualified by the unjustifiable assumption
(first appearing in the Wolff case) that price regulation differs
essentially from other forms of regulation; and the Court proceeded
to apply its "test" of public devotion. It asked, "Is the business one
'affected with a public interest,' within the meaning of that phrase as
heretofore defined by this Court?" (Italics ours.) Under this
"standard" which had determined "all the decisions of this Court
from Munn v. Illinois," the invalidity of the New Jersey enactment
became apparent. Emphasis upon lack of precedent, borrowed from
the Wolff case, and a specious solicitude for freedom of contract,
for which we remember the Adkins decision, aided the conclusion, but
it was the Tyson case that clinched the situation. There, observed
the Court, "we declared unconstitutional an act of the New York
legislature which sought to fix the price at which theatre tickets
should be sold by a ticket broker, and it is not easy to see how, without
disregarding that decision, price-fixing legislation in respect of other
brokers of like character can be upheld. An employment agency is
essentially a private business." "Of course," admitted the Court,
"anything which substantially interferes with employment is a matter
of public concern"; yet, it perceived "no reason for applying a different rule in the case of legislation controlling prices to be paid for services rendered in securing a place for an employe or an employe for a
"Chief Justice Taft's opinion in Wolff Co. v. Industrial Court, 262 U. S.
522, 43 Sup. Ct. 630 (1923) introduced the category to the field of due process.
This decision and that of Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup.
Ct. 394 (1923) are held in highest respect by the present majority.
7Justice Sutherland wrote for the Court, with the concurrence of the Chief
Justice and Justices McReynolds, Van Devanter, and Butler. Justice Sanford,
who dissented in the Tyson case, concurred upon what he deemed the controlling
authority of that decision.
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place." 8 With a final refusal to attach persuasive force to the
existence of numerous similar enactments, the task was done-the
quilt had another patch, and Tyson v. Banton, a congenial neighbor.
For the dissenters, 9 Justice Stone pointed to the obvious distinction between the regulation here attempted and that considered in the
Tyson case. He argued strongly for the presumption of constitutionality and for deference to the legislative knowledge of local conditions. As did Justice Brandeis in Adams v. Tanner, 10 he made
extensive use of available data revealing the trend of informed
opinion and establishing the reasonable basis of the legislative action.
The baseless distinction between limitation of charges and other
regulation he dismissed with the pointed remark that, "The price
paid for property or services is only one of the terms in a bargain;
the effect on the parties is similar whether the restriction on the
power to contract affects the price, or the goods or services sold.""
To round out his argument, he presented a concise review of the
leading cases upholding regulatory enactments, and admonished the
majority that by its decision it was exempting from legislative price
control all but public utilities.
A recent writer said of the majority opinion in the Tyson case,
"a sense of the actualities, or of a willingness that men of to-day
may make the laws of to-day is entirely absent." 12 Of a certainty,
the same is true of its prototype, Ribnik v. McBride. Here too, a
decision is reached through the professed application of long enduring
standards. Excerpts from Lord Hale's De Portibus Maris provide
the "historical test" of the constitutionality of present-day legislation.
That the author was there stating the law as it existed in his time
when bailment theories bulked large, 13 and under a different governmental system, seems clear. How his statements justify stifling the
expansion of our governmental agencies remains unexplained. The
test of devotion to the public interest seems also better suited to
explaining a result already achieved.' 4 Devotion is indeed fictional,
for in none of the instances where the Court found this "devotion"
did the complainant have any such intention, else he would not have
S Quoted

material appears at 48 Sup. Ct. 545, 546.
' To be sure, Justices Holmes and Brandeis dissented. To read Professor
Frankfurter's eulogistic, Mr. Justice Hohnes and the Constitution, 41 Harv. L.
Rev. 121 (1927) is to be convinced of the utter impossibility of the contrary
action. Justice Brandeis' able dissent in Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590, 597,
37 Sup. Ct. 662 (1917) should have induced a similar conviction.
'0 Supra, note 9.
" 48 Sup. Ct. at 552.
' Robinson, The Public Utility Concept in Ainerican Law, 41 Harv. L. Rev.
277, 290 (1928).
'The reader will find this point well developed in Robinson, supra, at pp.
279-280. There is also there a valuable analysis of judicial development from
Munn v. Illinois, of how the Court later achieved similar results without finding
all the circumstances deemed controlling in the earlier case.
" Finkelstein, From Munn v. Illinois to Tyson v. Banton, 27 Col. L. Rev.
769 (1927) tersely reveals the artificiality of the Court's professed standards.
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been a complainant. Too, definitions of "public interest" must be as
various as those who hazard the task. Equally illusory is that
"fundamental law" to which the Court appeals when its factual
findings convince it that expediency requires the substitution of its
own judgment for that of the legislature. 15 A brief reference to the
judicial development of the concept of due process should suffice to
show that the Court's long-standing tests are, in fact, ephemeral.
Before the Civil War, due process was a procedural concept. 16 In
the Slaughter House cases, it was given scant consideration though
Mr. Warren is of the opinion that Federal relief from the arbitrary
action of Louisiana's carpet-bag legislature was eminently desirable.' 7
Subsequent development has been acutely analyzed by Professor
Frankfurter Is-he sees the dissents from the non-interference policy
of Munn v. Illinois established as majority doctrine with the decision
of Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 19 and displaced by Justice Holmes' dissent
in Lochner v. New York 20 ; since the World War, he sees a reversion
to the Field-Peckham era. 2' There have, in short, been no enduring
principles formulated in this long conflict between private desire and.
public authority.
Should deserved attention be given the actualities, it must be
apparent that when the present majority strikes down social legislation
aimed at a demonstrated evil, it is sanctioning a right to oppress. To
set aside a minimum wage law out of solicitude for a necessitous
22
worker's right to contract freely seems the extreme of sophistry.
To apply an inapplicable (though closest in time) precedent to void
-the regulation in the Ribnik case seems equally unwarranted. But
the current trend is toward "the supremacy of the Court over legislation, 23 and until that trend is arrested by processes extra-judicial, it
In this connection, see Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power, and
the Supreme Court, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 943, 966 (1927).
asHough, supra note 1 at 224.
258.
'73 WARREN, TEE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1922)
Paradoxically, the circumstances of the Ribnik case called strongly for Federal
non-interference.
a Frankfurter, fupra note 9 at 143-144.
"165 U. S. 578, 17 Sup. Ct. 427 (1896).
S198 U. S.45, 25 Sup. Ct. 539 (1905).
= Other turning points are discussed, in Hough, supra note 1, and at page
226 he reveals his early impression of the significance of the Granger cases, 94
U. S. 155, 164, 179, 180 (1877). Finkelstein, szpra note 14, emphasizes the
departure made in St. Paul Railroad v. Minnesota, 134 U. S.418 (1890) ; while
Brown, supra note 15, stresses Harlan's opinion in Mugler v. Kansas, 123
U. S.623 (1887).
Thus the Court explains the Adkins decision, 48 Sup. Ct. at 546.
= Brown, supra note 15, has prepared a statistical survey which indicates
that since 1920, the Court has invalidated social legislation in 28% of the cases
presented. For the years 1913-1920, the figure was approximately 7%. In
numbers, the Court invalidated more statutes in the six years following 1920,
than in all the fifty-two previous years of the existence of the Fourteenth
Amendment. An estimate of the relative social importance of the enactments
voided, however, cannot well be presented mathematically.
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is fairly certain to continue. Since the political realignment at the
close of the war, reaction to all governmental regulation of business
has been pronounced, and in that reaction, the Supreme Court has
enacted a significant role.24 Complacent acceptance of the catchphrases of the incumbent political leaders augurs the continuance of
judicial supremacy. Only a revision of personnel or, of what is less
likely, perspective, will ensure patches of another hue.25 Until then,
much remediable exploitation will continue, and those who echo the
demand for the status quo will unwittingly share the increased
cost imposed by lack of foresight.

V. J. K.

SUFFICIENCY OF NOTICE BY PUBLICATION IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS.--In 1912, a resident of Virginia, executed a mortgage for

$25,000. upon real property situated in Brooklyn, New York. Several years later, after the death of the mortgagor, foreclosure proceedings were instituted by the holders of the mortgage. Application
was made to the Supreme Court for leave to serve the non-resident
heirs of the mortgagor by publication and an order was thereafter
duly entered directing that the summons be published for the requisite
number of times in two local newspapers, the "Brooklyn Daily Times"
and the "Brooklyn Citizen." The order also required the mailing of
copies in accordance with the provisions of the statute.' Through an
error of a clerk employed by the attorneys for plaintiffs in that action,
the advertisement was inserted in the "Brooklyn Daily Eagle"
instead of the "Brooklyn Daily Times," one of the two papers designated in the order for publication.
The heirs, all residents of Virginia, failed or neglected to appear
and judgment of foreclosure was entered by default, the property
bringing but $10,000. upon the sale. The mistake in publication was
not discovered until much later and was not rectified until 1924, when
plaintiffs in the foreclosure action procured an ex parte order amending nunc pro tunc the orddr of publication so that it read "Brooklyn
Daily Eagle" instead of "Brooklyn Daily Times," as originally.
'

Professor Beard in his recent

THE AMERICAN PARTY BATT=E

has directed

attention to the resultant conservatism of all branches of government, and
particularly (p. 130) to the conservative leadership in the Court.
'Judge Hough's conclusion of but ten years ago, that "the courts, when
invoked to-day under the due-process clause, are doing little more than easing

the patient's later days," 32 Harv. L. Rev. at 233, is impossible of present

application. An entirely reasonable observation at the fiftieth anniversary of
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment has become unwarranted at the
sixtieth, yet the Court insists that "standards" have been maintained.
1 C. P. A., Sec. 232; General Rules of Practice, 50-52.

